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Introduction 
 
 
Greece: Light at the End of the Tunnel 
Jens Bastian 
Where does Greece stand today, six years after the outbreak of a severe economic crisis, 
which has led to drastic social repercussions and contributed to major political changes 
in the country? Key questions are being asked in public debates: If Greece requires a 
third rescue programme, what compliance requirements should be included, and how 
would such a programme be financed? 
 
Greece has been a member of the euro zone 
since 2001. Cheaper mortgages, reduced 
yields on sovereign debt, and a rapid in-
crease in public sector employment were 
key drivers of modernisation processes in 
the country’s economy and society after 
accession to the euro zone. 
In these presumably “good years” were 
the underlying causes for the country’s 
emerging economic crisis in 2008, which 
was followed by the onset of the sovereign 
debt crisis in 2010. The structural deficits 
in Greece’s economy, already apparent in 
2004, were temporarily overlooked, or 
even outright ignored. The rapid economic 
upturn during the first decade of the new 
millennium was not sustainable. It was 
credit-financed and centred on imports and 
private consumption. 
A decade later, both the economy and 
society of Greece are at a crossroads. The 
direction that the country chooses shall 
clarify if the current reform process can be 
sustained after the troika of international 
lenders (the International Monetary Fund 
[IMF], the European Commission [EC] and 
the European Central Bank [ECB]) stops 
exercising compliance pressure. It remains 
to be seen whether better (economic) times 
will appear on the horizon. There are 
equally good reasons to be both cautiously 
optimistic as well as sceptical about Greece’s 
future course. 
The Situation in Mid-2014 
At the beginning of 2014, Greece held the 
rotating European Union (EU) presidency 
for six months. The presidency offered the 
political elites in Athens the opportunity to 
highlight the achievements of the macro-
economic reform process begun in 2010 to 
a broader European public that continues 
to have reservations about the country’s 
progress. 
According to data published by the 
Greek statistical agency, ELSTAT, after six 
years of a severe recession, various indica-
tors are signalling a gradual turnaround in 
the real economy. In the second quarter of 
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 2014, the Greek economy contracted by 0.3 
per cent (compared to Q2-2013), suggesting 
that a return to positive growth territory is 
within reach. 
The emerging economic stabilisation is 
primarily the result of a successful year 
for tourism (in 2013 more than 18 million 
tourists visited Greece, a record level) and 
the international demand for container 
shipping, for which Greece is a major pro-
vider. But this recovery is still too fragile 
across other sectors of the real economy and 
has yet to reach the centre of Greek society. 
The social costs of this economic adjust-
ment process are staggering. In the foresee-
able future, more than half of those em-
ployed will not be in a position to regain 
their income levels from before the crisis. 
Sustainable improvement in the Greek 
labour market is not yet visible. Those who 
do find work are frequently subject to pre-
carious employment conditions. The Greek 
central bank is forecasting that the regis-
tered unemployment rate will remain stag-
nant above 26 per cent in 2014. In June 
2014 registered unemployment reached 27 
per cent, whereas the unemployment rate 
for youths (under 25 years) stood at 51.5 per 
cent – the second-highest level in the euro 
zone after Spain. 
The challenges that Greece continues to 
face remain enormous. The macro-econom-
ic adjustment process, under way since May 
2010, has achieved impressive fiscal con-
solidation. For the first time in a decade, 
Greece registered a primary budgetary sur-
plus (before interest payments) in 2013. The 
economy’s competitiveness was improved 
through a dramatic reduction in the cur-
rent account deficit, chiefly by curtailing 
imports. 
This progress is being challenged by 
persistent deficits in other policy fields. 
Increases in the country’s export capacity 
have failed to materialise. In July 2014 
exports declined by 1.1 per cent compared 
to July of last year (including oil exports). 
Improvements in the economy’s productiv-
ity levels are the result of deep wage cuts 
and the consequences of mass unemploy-
ment. The high interest rates that domestic 
banks charge for investment credit are neu-
tralising these productivity gains. Domestic 
consumption remains weak and is failing 
to position the economic recovery on a 
broader scale across Greek society. Foreign 
direct investment in the real economy is 
stagnating, not least because the privatisa-
tion process lacks support from large con-
stituencies in Greek society. The divestment 
process is also frequently subject to politi-
cal controversies and hampered by adminis-
trative delays and judicial proceedings. 
Political Risk Factors 
Although the process of economic stabilisa-
tion is under way, Greece is confronted with 
a variety of political risk factors. In June 
2012 a two-party coalition formed between 
the conservative New Democracy (ND) and 
the left-of-centre PASOK and is led by Prime 
Minister Antonis Samaras in Athens. By 
mid-2014 its original majority of 30 MPs 
had shrunk to four due to a combination 
of resignations, changing sides, and exclu-
sions. 
The elections to the European Parlia-
ment in May 2014 reinforced the trend of 
political polarisation in Greece. For the first 
time, the largest opposition party, the radi-
cal-left Syriza, managed to win elections. 
Despite its success, Syriza’s share of the vote 
stagnated, reaching 26.55 per cent – a frac-
tional decline from its level of 26.89 per 
cent attained in the national elections of 
June 2012. 
The governing ND was 3.9 per cent 
behind Syriza in the European elections. 
Together with its junior partner PASOK, the 
governing coalition reached 30.7 per cent. 
That share of the vote enabled the Samaras 
government to claim that it had not lost 
the elections and continue with its man-
date. On the basis of this result, no party 
would be in a position to form a govern-
ment in Athens today. Politically rather 
unrealistic – even if mathematically pos-
sible – would be a “grand coalition” 
between Syriza and ND. 
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 Since the back-to-back general elections 
of May and June 2012, the party political 
landscape of Greece has been completely 
uprooted. The decades-old patronage sys-
tem has collapsed. The governing parties 
are not in a position to sustain clientelistic 
networks anymore, for example by promis-
ing employment in the public sector in ex-
change for voters’ allegiance. Consequently, 
the political centre in Greece has imploded. 
The fascist Golden Dawn (GD) has bene-
fited from this implosion, managing to 
gain third place in the European elections. 
With its share of the vote at 9.4 per cent, 
GD was able to relegate the governing 
PASOK to fourth place. With a focus on 
migration, law and order, and the emphasis 
on foreign domination by the troika and 
Angela Merkel’s government in Berlin, GD 
succeeded in tapping into frustrations and 
anxieties in Greek society. GD is increasing-
ly adept at converting the pool of protest 
voters into a permanent electoral base. To 
date, neither the governing coalition nor 
the other opposition parties have been able 
to formulate a convincing political strategy 
on how to confront the challenges pre-
sented by GD. 
In February 2015 the mandate of Greece’s 
president, Karolos Papoulias (born in 1929), 
expires. If the current parliament cannot 
succeed in voting for a new head of state 
with an extended majority of 180 votes out 
of a total of 300, then the Hellenic constitu-
tion calls for the dissolution of parliament 
and early general elections. At present, the 
governing ND-PASOK coalition only has a 
majority of 154 seats. 
The largest opposition party, Syriza, has 
repeatedly announced that it will not nomi-
nate a candidate of its own, nor will it sup-
port a contender proposed by the governing 
coalition. In taking this no-compromise 
position, Syriza seeks to establish the lever-
age necessary to trigger early elections in 
2015, provided the political polarisation in 
the Greek parliament remains. 
Greece and the Troika 
On 2 September 2014 the quarterly evalu-
ation mission of the troika with the Greek 
delegation resumed in Paris. The choice of 
location sought to signal that a normalisa-
tion of the working relationship between 
both sides is in play. In selecting the French 
capital, participants also wanted to reduce 
the political tension that is inherent in the 
standard evaluation missions of the troika 
when visiting Athens. 
The troika of international creditors is 
gradually readjusting its activities. This is 
due to the fact that the European-funding 
part of the second macro-economic adjust-
ment programme expires at the end of 
2014. IMF financing for Greece is scheduled 
to continue until early 2016. In the mean-
time, the examples of Ireland and Portugal 
have attracted followers in Athens. Dublin 
successfully exited its troika programme in 
December 2013 and was followed by Lisbon 
in May 2014. 
The financial diplomats from the troika 
initially agreed with the Greek authorities 
in 2010 and 2011 about the implementa-
tion of a comprehensive structural reform 
agenda in exchange for the provision of 
credit facilities worth billions to stave off 
imminent default – both rescue programmes 
have a total value of 240 billion euros. With 
this bailout arrangement, all parties in-
volved moved into uncharted territory for 
dealing with a euro zone member. As 
became quickly apparent, the willingness 
of Greek authorities to implement sweep-
ing structural reforms had political limi-
tations. By the same token, the chemistry 
between the three troika institutions was 
a permanent work in progress. 
In a May 2013 ex-post evaluation of 
Greece’s first rescue package, the IMF high-
lighted major flaws in its approach, pro-
jections, and programme execution. The 
IMF came to the conclusion that the pro-
gramme conception was erroneous, the 
administrative capacities of the Greek civil 
service to implement the agreed bench-
marks were overrated, and the structural 
deficits of the real economy proved to be 
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 much deeper than initially assumed. Based 
on assumptions that were far too optimis-
tic, the troika failed to identify the dra-
matic increase in unemployment, nor did 
it accordingly project the disruptions to 
the real economy, which provoked a much 
longer recession than had been estimated 
in mid-2010. 
For 2014 the IMF expects a debt-to-GDP 
ratio for Greece of more than 174 per cent. 
Such an amount would surpass the sover-
eign debt levels attained in 2011, that is, 
before the two debt-restructuring operations 
of 2012. Without both debt-reduction ma-
noeuvres, Greece’s total indebtedness would 
today be in the range of 380 billion euros, 
roughly equivalent to 208 per cent of an-
nual GDP. 
The two rescue packages for Greece from 
2010 and 2011 – in combination with the 
debt-restructuring exercise and the debt 
buy-back operation of 2012 – have together 
contributed to a significant transformation 
in the configuration of Greece’s debt vol-
ume. Today more than 85 per cent of the 
sovereign’s obligations are held in port-
folios and budgets of official creditors. In 
mid-2014 the euro zone member states, the 
ECB, the IMF, the European Financial Sta-
bility Facility, and the European Stability 
Mechanism are the key guarantors of 
Greece’s sovereign debt. This liability ex-
posure of official creditors is the result of 
unprecedented debt migration from the 
private sector to public institutions. This re-
profiling of Greece’s sovereign obligations 
makes any future debt restructuring an 
exercise that would almost entirely impact 
the official sector of Greece’s creditors. 
The second macro-economic adjustment 
programme of Greece with the troika in-
cludes a provision in which the country’s 
debt mountain has to be reduced to 124 per 
cent of GDP by 2020. There are, however, 
serious doubts about the attainability of 
this objective. After six years of recession, 
Greece’s growth potential is too weakened 
to generate the levels of GDP performance 
necessary to achieve this ambitious debt-to-
GDP ratio. The projections by the European 
Commission provide for an economic recov-
ery that reaches 0.6 per cent this year and a 
growth rate of 2.9 per cent in 2015. 
It is also by no means self-evident that 
Greece will be able to achieve a primary sur-
plus in its central budget every year, prefer-
ably with incremental increases in volume. 
Bringing the debt volume down to sustain-
able levels by stretching the repayment 
timetable to 50 years implies burdening 
the next generation with a major liability. 
Moreover, Syriza has already announced 
that, in the event of it leading a government 
in 2015, the party will seek a profound 
policy U-turn. Syriza would reject fiscal 
austerity, fundamentally change working 
arrangements with the troika, and call for 
an international debt conference for euro 
zone countries, starting with Greece. 
The Role of Greek Banks 
In 2013 the four largest Greek banks (by 
assets) were recapitalised. Contrary to the 
origins of the crisis in Ireland, Spain, and 
Cyprus, the Greek financial sector did not 
trigger the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. 
Still, since the four largest domestic finan-
cial institutions were heavily exposed to 
Greek sovereign debt, the implementation 
of the debt-restructuring operation in 2012 
adversely impacted on their balance sheets. 
As a result, they held negative capital ad-
equacy ratios and were not in a position to 
raise additional resources on international 
markets. One option was the liquidation of 
the banks, with the concurrent implosion 
of the Greek financial sector; alternatively, 
saving the four largest banks through state-
sponsored recapitalisation became the 
default option, despite major controversies 
surrounding this decision. 
The four systemically relevant banks 
were recapitalised with 41 billion euros, 
which were provided from resources in-
cluded in the second macro-economic ad-
justment programme. Today, the National 
Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank, 
and Eurobank comply with financial con-
ditionalities demanded by the troika and 
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 adhere to international capital adequacy 
ratio standards. However, this achievement 
should not be confused with the assump-
tion that Greek banks now have enough 
resources to provide liquidity to the real 
economy. As a matter of fact, the credit 
crunch for private households and cor-
porate entities continues unabated. The 
domestic lending institutions have not 
returned to their original mandate, that is, 
providing the real economy with affordable 
and timely credit facilities. This applies 
particularly to small and medium-sized 
businesses (SMEs), which are the backbone 
of the Greek economy. 
Any attempt to put the economy back 
on a firm footing will only succeed when 
domestic banks can contribute to the cause. 
But to date, local banks continue to exercise 
considerable restraint when providing cred-
it facilities to companies. The reasons for 
this reservation are not primarily due to 
the banks themselves, but originate in the 
balance sheet compliance requirements of 
the ECB’s asset quality review (AQR) and 
stress-testing of European banks in the 
autumn of 2014. 
As with numerous other European banks, 
the four systemically relevant Greek insti-
tutions are required to either de-leverage 
their risk-weighted assets or alternatively 
provision for these through higher capital 
ratios. In the balance sheets of local banks, 
credit provided to SMEs are rated as risk-
weighted assets. In anticipation of the ECB’s 
AQR and stress tests, banks have little in-
centive to burden their balance sheets with 
credit to struggling SMEs. 
In light of persistent liquidity deficits in 
the real economy of Greece, interest rates 
on available credit for investment are far 
too elevated for companies to express any 
demand. To illustrate: A German medium-
sized firm, which exports to south-east 
Europe and seeks a credit facility of 1 
million euros for up to five years currently 
pays an interest rate ranging from 2.5 per 
cent to 4 per cent. By contrast, a Greek 
company that is export-oriented, despite a 
multi-year recession, faces credit charges 
between 6 per cent and 8.5 per cent. These 
are the highest lending rates since Greece 
joined the euro zone in 2001. 
A normalisation of credit transmission 
channels through the Greek banking sector 
is urgently called for. The liquidity position 
of domestic institutions can only improve 
when two processes occur in tandem. First, 
following upgrades in their credit rating, 
Greek banks are able to return to interna-
tional capital markets while simultane-
ously reducing their reliance on liquidity 
facilities from the ECB. Secondly, Greek 
banks must continue to strengthen their 
deposits. In the past five years, local banks 
have lost more than 30 per cent of their 
customers’ deposits. This drain of liquidity 
has only gradually been reversed. Today, 
the problem is not capital flight. Rather, 
private households and corporate entities 
use their deposits to pay for mounting tax 
obligations and service-accumulated debt. 
EU Funding and Financial Innovation 
The financial engineering instruments 
available to Greece from EU funding pro-
grammes – structural funds, regional devel-
opment fund, cohesion and social funds – 
have achieved a significant increase in 
absorption levels since 2011. In the course 
of the past four years, Greek managing 
authorities have made a determined effort 
to use these funding resources from Brus-
sels. In December 2010 Greece ranked in 
17th position among all 28 EU member 
states as concerned the rate of structural 
fund absorption. Only 21.86 per cent of 
all available funding facilities had been 
attracted. Four years later, the position of 
Hellas in the EU funding table has dramati-
cally improved. By June 2014 Greece had 
moved into fourth position, with the ab-
sorption rate of structural funds reaching 
81.26 per cent. 
This turnaround is the result of various 
factors, not least the collaboration of Greek 
authorities with representatives from 
the European Commission’s Task Force for 
Greece (TFGR), which has been active in 
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 Athens since 2011. The TFGR’s key tasks are 
to provide and coordinate technical assis-
tance for Greek ministries and regulatory 
authorities. The TFGR (for which the author 
of this contribution worked for two years) 
was established following a request from 
then Prime Minister Giorgos Papandreou 
in mid-2011. The Commission in Brussels 
created the TFGR in order to improve the 
capacity of public administration to imple-
ment the compliance requirements stipu-
lated in the second macro-economic adjust-
ment programme. 
The World Bank, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
or the World Health Organisation provide 
technical assistance in cooperation with 
member states of the EU and the Commis-
sion in Brussels. Together they formed an 
institutional network of applied solidarity 
with Greek authorities and focussed on 
capacity-building as well as implementa-
tion and monitoring of the structural 
reform agenda. The TFGR coordinates the 
network of technical assistance, helps in 
identifying bi- and multilateral project pro-
moters and reports about its work streams 
such as tax administration, health services, 
procurement and fund absorption on a 
quarterly basis to the public in Greece and 
within EU institutions. 
The significant improvement in the 
absorption capacity of EU funding pro-
grammes by Greek authorities is also the 
result of administrative changes at the 
Commission level. In 2011 the Brussels 
executive granted Greece a reduction of its 
co-financing share in EU-funded projects – 
from the initial level of 15 to 20 per cent 
to the new level of 5 per cent. In addition, 
different Directorates-General of the Com-
mission acknowledged that the country’s 
severe economic recession required more 
administrative flexibility in the manage-
ment and regional distribution of EU funds. 
A second institution has also made a sig-
nificant contribution towards alleviating 
the situation on the ground. The financing 
arm of the European Commission – the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) in Luxem-
bourg – is the single largest foreign direct 
investor in the real economy. In 2013 the 
EIB invested upwards of 1.47 billion euros. 
The credit facilities of the EIB focus on in-
frastructure projects such as the extension 
of the Athens metro, the construction of 
the new Thessaloniki metro, tourism pro-
motion, initiatives combating youth un-
employment, motorway construction, etc. 
The higher absorption levels of EU 
funding programmes and the investment 
activities of the EIB are much-needed 
sources of liquidity-injection into the Greek 
real economy. Both financing facilities have 
a pro-cyclical effect and contribute to stabi-
lising the emerging economic recovery. 
Moreover, they compensate for the lack of 
liquidity provisions from private sources, 
local banks and constrained resources in 
the public investment budget. 
However, we should not lose sight of a 
potential risk inherent in such funding 
arrangements. In the medium-term, EU 
funds and EIB credit facilities cannot con-
tinue to substitute for the lack of domestic 
investment and compensate for the dearth 
of foreign direct investment. There is a risk 
that a mentality of dependency from Euro-
pean funding institutions prevails across 
the Greek economy. 
Furthermore, the successful absorption 
of European funding facilities is primarily 
focussed on large infrastructure projects. 
But on the ground, SMEs are having a much 
harder time gaining access to EU funding 
programmes. The obstacles they face are 
administratively arduous and time-consum-
ing. During the 2007–2013 EU financing 
period, Greece only absorbed an astonish-
ingly low 6.4 per cent of all available struc-
tural funds earmarked for SME financing. 
These funding programmes focussed on 
making investment capital available to SME 
development in Greece. But under the con-
ditions of a multi-year recession, most SMEs 
need operational capital in order to finance 
their current activities. The Commission in 
Brussels was rather restrictive in providing 
such financing options. Instead, it under-
lined that the 2014–2020 funding period 
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 would offer working capital schemes. But 
until these facilities are fully operational, 
much administrative time will have passed 
and may arrive too late for eligible SMEs. 
In order to confront this challenge, a 
major financial innovation has recently 
been developed in Greece. After time-con-
suming negotiations with the troika about 
its investment mandate and funding ar-
rangements, the legal preconditions were 
passed by the Greek Parliament in Decem-
ber 2013 to create the Institution for 
Growth (IfG). 
The IfG is an investment fund mandated 
to provide liquidity to the real economy. 
One of its sub-funds is focussed on investing 
in Greek SMEs. Although the IfG will oper-
ate in Greece, it was registered in Luxem-
bourg. Its initial capital is a combination of 
various sources, ranging from the budget 
of the Hellenic Republic to a contribution 
from the Onassis Foundation. In addition, 
the German Federal Ministry of Finance 
contributes – via its development bank 
KfW – 100 million euros in start-up capital, 
mainly earmarked for SME financing. 
Does Greece Need a 
Third Programme? 
Representatives of the Greek government 
have repeatedly emphasised during the 
past months that the country does not re-
quire a third financial support programme. 
They argue that in April 2014, Greece suc-
cessfully returned to international bond 
markets after a three-year forced hiatus. 
Furthermore, the primary surplus achieved 
in 2013 – and the one expected for this year 
– underline that the government in Athens 
is in a position to finance its current expen-
diture requirements. 
The current troika negotiations are con-
centrated on the evaluation of the struc-
tural reform requirements. In the later 
stages of these consultations, the complex 
issue of Greece’s debt sustainability will be 
addressed. The outcome of these consulta-
tions will determine if Greece requires a 
third programme. 
If such a programme were to materialise, 
what could be its key elements? As a point 
of departure, the terminology would have 
to be carefully crafted. The term “memoran-
dum” has been negatively associated with 
the two preceding programmes and is 
linked to a period that Greeks want to leave 
behind as quickly as possible. 
Clear conceptual and methodological 
demarcation lines will have to be drawn 
compared to its predecessors. A stringent 
focus on fiscal consolidation and the sta-
bility of the banking sector – important in 
their own right – cannot continue to define 
a new support programme. Rather, such a 
“cooperation agreement” would have to 
consider how Greece could be institution-
ally supported in its reform endeavours. 
The focus now turns to the challenge of 
how the implementation of a new growth 
agenda can be made permanent and irre-
versible. 
In order to strengthen the reform impe-
tus in the Greek political economy, it is 
necessary to broaden the focus of current 
deliberations. The European creditor com-
munity must move beyond the considera-
tion of further interest rate reductions or 
maturity extensions on the official loans 
provided to Greece. Rather, a cooperation 
agreement with Athens would emphasise 
the implementation of a new growth 
agenda. Critically, any agreement needs to 
have greater support among Greek citizens 
and participating institutions. Five key 
reform areas are herewith proposed: 
At the horizontal level, the programme 
would have to formulate cross-cutting issues 
that affect all sectors of the real economy, in 
particular as regards domestic and foreign 
investment capacity. One area where imple-
mentation delays and administrative defi-
cits are distinct concerns the privatisation 
process. Issues such as the valorisation of 
public property and the capacity to construct 
securitisation arrangements for these assets 
deserve greater attention. This approach 
argues in favour of long-term leasing ar-
rangements and greater leverage in the cor-
porate management of public property. 
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 In order to promote Greek export 
capacity, arrangements at the bilateral 
and/or European level should be explored 
that facilitate the availability of export 
insurance guarantees for Greek companies. 
The further rationalisation and digitalisa-
tion of customs procedures is part and 
parcel of such an export promotion policy. 
For new businesses, including start-ups, 
the availability of micro-finance structures 
needs to be advanced in Greece. Frequently, 
new SMEs do not lack innovative ideas but 
seed capital, which such start-ups continue 
to have great difficulty receiving from their 
local banks. A targeted implementation of 
European funding programmes and tech-
nical assistance that lays the groundwork 
for micro-finance structures in Greece is 
necessary. 
A new cooperation agreement with 
Greece should focus on institutional capac-
ity-building. This requires fine-tuning the 
coordination of technical assistance pro-
vided by international stakeholders and 
increasing the participation of expertise 
from Greek institutions. Instead of debating 
if Greece needs further financial assistance 
in the form of lending programmes, atten-
tion should turn towards facilitating the 
financing of technical assistance for Greece. 
The possibilities for combining existing 
financing options for Greece have not been 
exhausted. This view does not call for addi-
tional official credit lines for the country. 
Preferably, it advocates strengthening syn-
ergies between different funding pro-
grammes and institutions, for example by 
seeking to enlarge the group of financial 
backers of the IfG with additional coun-
tries, banks, and international organisa-
tions. The integration of new funding part-
ners into the IfG would broaden its oper-
ational capacity and open new avenues for 
SME financing. 
Looking Forward 
The fragile economic recovery manifesting 
itself in Greece needs to be anchored across 
a broader scale of sectors, domestic con-
sumption, and investment volumes. This 
endeavour is facing old obstacles and new 
headwinds. The sanctions regime adopted 
by the European Commission against 
Russia adversely affects the Greek export 
industry, in particular the agricultural sec-
tor. A further consequence of counter-sanc-
tions could be a decline in tourist arrivals 
from Russia. 
New challenges following geopolitical 
disruptions are literally arriving at Greece’s 
doorsteps. The refugee influx from Syria, 
Iraq, and the Maghreb are overstraining the 
administrative capacities of Greek border 
institutions. Since the beginning of 2014, 
the Greek border authorities have regis-
tered more than 17,000 new refugees. The 
government in Athens has urgently asked 
the European Commission to provide addi-
tional funding resources for improved 
cross-border management, the construction 
of reception centres for refugees, as well as 
quicker registration procedures. 
The structural adjustments currently 
under way in the Greek political economy 
are profound and have incurred high social 
costs. Adhering to the fiscal consolidation 
imperatives of the troika has given rise to 
non-intended consequences in terms of mass 
unemployment, the implosion of domestic 
consumption, and a prolonged credit crunch 
in the real economy. It will take time until 
structural reforms take effect and gain 
traction. 
The key objective of decision-makers in 
Greece and its European partners remains 
the improvement of social cohesion and 
ameliorating the operational conditions for 
a sustainable economic recovery. Removing 
obstacles along the way remains a hercu-
lean task. The manner in which solidarity 
with Greece manifests itself in the near 
future critically depends on the stability 
and predictability that the government in 
Athens displays in the coming months. 
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